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ABSTRACT 
Materiel Returns Program (MRP) credits have increased 1st Marine Logistics 
Group’s (1st MLG) total obligation authority by an average of 27% annually since 
2008. However, 1st MLG has been unable to leverage the MRP in budget 
execution due to an inability to forecast future credits.  
The purpose of this research is to determine whether analysis of historical 
MRP credits at 1st MLG could enable the comptroller to forecast future credits, 
which would enable 1st MLG to leverage MRP credits and budget more 
efficiently in a constrained fiscal environment. This research utilized descriptive 
analysis of historical credits to identify systemic patterns or trends associated 
with MRP. The analysis of MRP credits focused on two specific areas: (1) the 
accuracy of credit estimates provided by the sources of supply (SOSs), and (2) 
the amount of time it took for 1st MLG to receive the actual credit.  
The primary finding of this research was that 1st MLG should be able to 
forecast MRP credits. The research showed that historically over a two-year 
period, SOSs accurately estimated credits 88.3% of the time and SOSs issued 
95% of all actual credits within 90 days of 1st MLG submitting an item into MRP. 
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In the wake of what Brigadier General Frank Kelley, Commander Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MCSC), has called the “bloated budgets” (as cited in 
Hoffman, 2011) of the past 10 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) is 
bracing for what are generally accepted to be significant budget cuts. In fact, 
current discussions on the subject of defense budgeting tend to include 
terminology such as fiscal austerity and constrained resources. The DoD is 
seeking to eliminate inefficiency and squeeze out every last bit of utility from 
every dollar. These financial challenges are currently being felt at 1st Marine 
Logistics Group (1st MLG) where Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding 
alone is $2 million less for fiscal year (FY) 2012 than it was in FY2011 (S. 
Goodwin, personal communication, October 11, 2011). In his annual budget 
formulation guidance, the commanding general, 1st MLG echoes Brigadier 
General Kelley’s sentiments, charging his commanders and staff to adopt “pre-
9/11 budget management best practices” and to be “vigilant stewards of limited 
resources” (Hudson, 2011, p. 1). Despite its constrained resources, 1st MLG 
undoubtedly will not experience any corresponding reduction in its operational 
requirements. 1st MLG, along with every other unit in the Marine Corps, must 
find ways to do more with less.  
1st MLG has a unique fiscal opportunity despite the constrained resources 
expected in years to come. Between FY2008 and FY2010, 1st MLG received, on 
average, $15.6 million in credits per year through the Materiel Returns Program 
(MRP). However, despite MRP credits essentially increasing its total obligation 
authority by as much as 27% annually, 1st MLG has been unable to forecast 
expected credits, preventing it from leveraging MRP to more effectively resource 
subordinate units. 
Historically, 1st MLG has been unable to leverage MRP credits in budget 
execution because it has not been able to accurately track how much credit they 
were going to receive or when the expected credits would post.  
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The inability to forecast expected credits can be attributed primarily to the 
difficulty in consolidating and analyzing the data required from multiple legacy 
systems. 
The 1st MLG comptroller initiated this research topic, specifically 
requesting an analysis of historical and expected Materiel Return Program (MRP) 
credits at the 1st MLG Reparable Issue Point (RIP). 1st MLG was seeking a 
more efficient way to resource subordinate units while developing budgets in a 
constrained fiscal environment. One method being considered by 1st MLG was 
to more effectively leverage MRP credits in budget planning and execution by 
forecasting the amount and timing of credits they will receive in the future.  
With our research, we attempted to assist the 1st MLG comptroller to 
determine whether it is possible to forecast MRP credits by answering the 
questions outlined in Sections A and B. 
A. PRIMARY QUESTION 
Can expected Materiel Returns Program (MRP) credits be forecasted at 
1st Marine Logistics Group (1st MLG)? 
B. SECONDARY QUESTIONS 
• What are the differences between 1st MLG’s estimated MRP 
credits and the actual credits it received? 
• What percentage of MRP credits does 1st MLG receive within 30, 
90, and 180 days of submitting a new MRP document to the source 
of supply (SOS)? 
To answer these questions, we analyzed historical credits from January 2008 to 
June 2011 to identify key trends pertaining to how many credits 1st MLG 
received and how long it took for those credits to post.  
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of our thesis is to identify trends associated with 
MRP credits that may enable 1st MLG to forecast expected credits and that may 
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assist with future resource distribution. Specifically, the intent of our thesis is to 
determine whether analysis of historical MRP credits can be used to forecast 
expected credits. We identified two specific areas for analysis that we believe 
can be used to determine whether forecasting MRP credits is possible: (1) the 
difference in estimated and actual credits and (2) the time between 1st MLG 
submitting an item to a SOS through MRP and that SOS issuing a credit to 1st 
MLG.  
In order to determine whether analysis of historical MRP credits could be 
used to forecast future credits, we needed to analyze all materiel and fiscal 
transactions associated with selected standard document numbers (SDNs) that 
generated actual MRP credits. We used our analysis of these transactions to 
identify systemic patterns or other trends associated with MRP credits at 1st 
MLG.  
D. RESEARCH SCOPE 
Our thesis research focuses on the MRP credits generated at 1st MLG’s 
RIP. Specifically, we analyzed the difference between estimated and actual MRP 
credits and the lead-times associated with 1st MLG receiving those credits.  
We did not include an analysis of MRP credits at the enterprise level or at 
any other command outside of 1st MLG. In addition, we did not analyze the MRP 
system/process itself or associated human touch points.  
Although MRP is used throughout the Marine Corps, only those individuals 
who work directly with the program on a regular basis tend to understand how 
the MRP system functions and the impact it has on the fiscal budgeting within the 
Marine Corps. In Chapter II, we provide the background and context required for 
someone to fully understand the analysis we present in later chapters. Chapter III 
defines the research methodology we used in our analysis and explains the 
limitations associated with our research. In Chapter IV, we present our data 
analysis. Finally, in Chapter V, we answer our research questions, summarize 
our conclusions, and recommend areas for future research. 
 4
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, we provide a background on the Marine Corps’ 
organization, maintenance, supply, and fiscal management that facilitates 
understanding of the data presented and analyzed in Chapter IV. Additionally, we 
offer details on the Materiel Returns Program (MRP) system, requirements, and 
process. Overall, in this chapter we introduce topics in a broad context to give 
perspective and then narrow the topics down to the specific areas on which we 
focused in our research.  
A. SECONDARY REPARABLES 
The Marine Corps classifies ground equipment repair parts as 
consumable and reparable. Consumable repair items cannot be repaired and are 
discarded when they become unserviceable. This research focused on reparable 
items, known as secondary reparables (SECREPs), which Marine Corps Order 
(MCO) P4400.151B (Headquarters, Marine Corps [HQMC], 1992) explains are 
reparable components/parts of a principal end item (PEI)1 that are neither 
consumable, nor functional by themselves. Examples of SECREPs and PEIs 
include a transmission (SECREP) for a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV; PEI) or a circuit board (SECREP) for a radar (PEI). SECREPs 
can be either depot-level reparables (DLRs) or field-level reparables (FLRs).  
DLR items can only be repaired at the depot level. MCO P4400.82 
(HQMC, 1985a) directs units to report SECREPs that are beyond the repair 
capability of lower maintenance echelons to Marine Corps Logistics Command 
(MARCORLOGCOM) for disposition instructions. According to MCO P4400.151B 
(HQMC, 1992), DLRs must meet one of the following criteria:  
                                            
1 MCO P4400.150E (HQMC, 1999b) defines principal end item (PEI) as “nonexpendable 
items of such importance that they require centralized management” (p. 1–9). PEIs are selected 
based on the following criteria: “essential for combat or training; high monetary value; difficult to 
procure or produce; and criticality of basic materials or components” (HQMC, 1999b, p. 1–9). 
Examples of PEIs include the AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radar system and M1A2 Abrams main battle 
tank. 
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• The item cannot be assembled in the field from finished parts 
authorized for supply-system stockage;  
• Rebuild at lower than depot level is impractical or will adversely 
diminish the mobility or dilute the maintenance support capability of 
the operator-level unit; or  
• Repair/rebuild requires skills, tools, test equipment, or facilities not 
available locally.  
MCO P4400.151B (HQMC, 1992) states that FLR items are repaired “at 
the lowest echelon of maintenance2 authorized to affect the required action” (p. 
5-5). FLRs are repaired by field maintenance activities such as the Maintenance 
Battalion within the Marine Logistics Group, which we discuss in greater detail 
later in this chapter. In later chapters, we make no distinction between DLR and 
FLR items; they are both referred to as SECREPs. 
1. Categories of SECREPs 
SECREPs are broken down into two categories, ground common (GC) 
and low density (LD). The difference between the two categories stems from the 
type of principle end item (PEI) that requires the SECREP and the activity that is 
authorized to perform maintenance on the SECREP. 
a. Ground Common 
Most SECREPs fall into the ground common account (AAC3: 
MMFAG8), which consists primarily of SECREPs for ground vehicle PEIs. An 
example of the ground common account is a transmission (SECREP) for a 
HMMWV (PEI). Using units do not retain the capability or authority to perform 
maintenance on ground common SECREPs. 
                                            
2 Appendix A provides an overview of the USMC echelons of maintenance.  
3 DoD 4400.25-6-M (DoD, 1996) defines Activity Address Code (AAC) as a “six position 
(alpha-numeric) code that uniquely identifies a unit, activity, or organization that has the authority 
to requisition and/or receive material” (p. xiii). 
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b. Low Density 
All other SECREPs fall into the low density account (AAC: 
MMFAG3) and are components to specialized PEIs, such as a circuit board 
(SECREP) for a radar system (PEI). Unlike ground common SECREPs, the units 
that own and operate the PEI retain the capability and authority to perform 
maintenance on low density SECREPs (J. R. Copley, personal communication, 
June 2, 2011).  
B. 1ST MARINE LOGISTICS GROUP 
1. 1st Marine Logistics Group 
1st Marine Logistics Group (1st MLG) is the logistics combat element of I 
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF),4 located at Camp Pendleton, CA. 1st MLG’s 
mission is to “provide direct support to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
Ground Combat Element (GCE) and general support and sustained tactical-level 
logistics support above the organic capabilities of supported elements of the 
MEF” (USMC, 2011b, Mission).  1st MLG accomplishes its assigned mission by 
performing the six functions of logistics for I MEF. MCDP-4 (HQMC, 1997a) 
identifies the six functional areas of logistics as “supply, maintenance, 
transportation, general engineering, health services, and other services, which 
include legal, exchange, food, disbursing, postal, billeting, religious, mortuary, 
and morale and recreation services” (p. 47). The supply and logistics functional 
areas are directly related to our research of MRP usage within 1st MLG’s 
Reparable Issue Point (RIP).  
1st MLG is composed of a headquarters element and three Combat 
Logistics Regiments (CLRs), as indicated by the command structure depicted in 
Figure 1. 
                                            
4 MCRP 5-2A (1997b) defines the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as “the Marine Corps’ 
principal warfighting organization and sole standing Marine Air–Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that 
exist in peacetime, as well as war” (HQMC, p. 1–97). A MEF’s size and composition can be 
tailored for specific operational requirements, but they generally consist of a standing command 
element (CE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a 
Logistics Combat Element (LCE).  
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Figure 1.   1st MLG Command Structure (From USMC, 2011a) 
2. Combat Logistics Regiment 15 
Of the three regiments within 1st MLG, CLR-1 and CLR-17 directly 
support the individual infantry regiments and the Marine Expeditionary Units 
(MEUs) within I MEF. In our thesis, we focus on CLR-15, which is in general 
support of the entire I MEF. The CLR-15 website (USMC, 2011c) describes the 
command’s mission as providing “intermediate level supply support, field level 
maintenance support, materiel distribution support, procurement management, 
and equipment fielding support.” CLR-15’s objectives, as stated by the 
commanding officer (as cited in USMC, 2011c), are to “overcome excessive 
order-ship times (OSTs), reduce total repair cycle-times (RCTs), and eliminate 
backorders … by partnering with supply chain and distribution experts to include 




CLR-15’s mission directly pertains to SECREP management and operation of the 
MRP, which is the focus of this research. All subsequent units and activities we 
discuss in this chapter have direct roles in these functions. 
3. 1st Maintenance Battalion  
As a subordinate element of CLR-15, 1st Maintenance Battalion (1st Maint 
BN) is responsible for “providing general support (GS) and task-organized direct 
support (DS) field-level maintenance support for Marine Corps-furnished tactical 
ordnance, engineer, motor transport, communications-electronics, and general 
support equipment of the MEF” (1st Maint BN, 2011, p. 3).  1st Maint BN’s 
essential tasks, as stated in the battalion’s command brief (1st Maint BN, 2011), 
include the following tasks:  
• Provide intermediate-level maintenance support,5 to include 
wheeled and tracked vehicle recovery, salvage and disposal, and 
general maintenance support, for I MEF's ground equipment. 
• Provide secondary reparable management, including inventory 
management, storage, financial accounting, and maintenance for 
secondary reparables. (1st Maint BN, 2011, p. 6)  
1st Maint BN is composed of a headquarters element and four 
subordinate companies, each responsible for specific components of the 
battalion’s mission, as indicated in Figure 2. Our research focused exclusively on 
the Reparable Management Company (RMC).  
                                            
5 Intermediate-level maintenance is “performed by designated activities with specially trained 
mechanics or technicians… and includes inspection/in-depth diagnosis, modification, 
replacement, adjustment, and limited repair or evacuation/disposal of principle end items and 
their selected reparables and components/sub-components. Intermediate-level maintenance also 
includes calibration and repair of test, measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDE), as well 
as fabrication of items, precision machining, and various methods of welding” (HQMC, 1994, p. 
1–4). Appendix A explains the USMC echelons of maintenance in greater detail.  
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Figure 2.   1st Maintenance Battalion Organizational Chart (After 1st 
Maintenance Battalion Command Brief by 1st Maint BN (2011). 
4. Reparable Management Company 
According to 1st Maint BN (2011), the RMC supports CLR-15’s general 
support mission in the following ways: 
• Providing general support field-level maintenance support6 for the 
MEF’s ground communication–electronics, motor transportation, 
engineer and ordnance equipment 
• Providing sourcing, inventory control, fiscal management, 
disposition, and intermediate maintenance support for ground 
equipment secondary reparables 
• Operating reparable issue points (RIPs) 
                                            
6 MCO P4790.2C (HQMC,1994) explains that Marine Corps maintenance is divided into field 
and depot level. Field maintenance includes organizational maintenance, which is the 
responsibility of the unit that owns the equipment being repaired, and intermediate maintenance, 
which is performed by “designated activities with specially trained mechanics and technicians” (p. 
1–4). Appendix A explains the USMC echelons of maintenance in greater detail. 
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C. REPARABLE ISSUE POINT (RIP) 
1. Mission 
The RIP, an intermediate-level supply activity within the RMC, functions as 
“the sole source for direct exchange of secondary depot reparable (SDR) items 
and field level reparable (FLR) items … in support of second, third, and fourth 
echelon maintenance”7 (HQMC, 1992, p. 3–17). As the sole source for SDR and 
FLR items, the RIP is responsible for centralized SECREP management within 
the MEF. 
2. Organization 
An RIP exists within each MEF. I MEF’s RIP is located at Camp 
Pendleton, CA. Although authorized and established by the commander, 
Logistics Command (LOGCOM), the RIP is organic to 1st MLG as an activity 
within the MLG’s maintenance battalion. In addition to the main RIP located at 
Camp Pendleton, CA, 1st MLG also operates six sub-RIPs to support I MEF 
ground units that are geographically separated from the main RIP and/or 










                                            
7 Appendix A provides an overview of the USMC echelons of maintenance.  
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Table 1.   Summary of 1st MLG Sub-RIPs 
Summary of 1st MLG Sub-RIPs 
Command Location Reason 
Combat Logistics 
Battalion 7 (CLB-7) 





Support I MEF ground 
units home stationed at 
MCAGCC 
Exercise Support Division MCAGCC, Twentynine 
Palms, CA 
Support ground units 
participating in exercise 




Company 16 (CLC-16) 
Marine Corps Air Station, 
Yuma, AZ 
Support tenant and 
augment ground units at 
Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) Yuma 
 
11th, 13th, & 15th Marine 
Expeditionary Units 
(MEUs) 
Camp Pendleton, CA Support I MEF ground 
units forward deployed 
as part of the MEU.  
 
 
Note. This table was created from data we received from 1st MLG. 
According to MCO P4400.151B (HQMC, 1992), 1st MLG’s sub-RIPs are 
assigned separate activity address codes (AACs), manage their own assigned 
assets, and maintain separate accounting records. However, the main RIP at 
Camp Pendleton maintains visibility of the sub-RIPs, exercises overall materiel 
and financial control of their activities, and reports a consolidated asset posture 
to LOGCOM. 
3. RIP Process Overview 
Upon receipt of an unserviceable SECREP from a customer, RIP 
management must determine whether the customer requires a serviceable 
replacement, and, if so, how best to fill that requirement. The RIP has four 
options to fill a requirement for serviceable SECREPs: (1) repairs by the 
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA), (2) repairs by the logistics integrated 
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support (LIS) contractor, (3) enterprise redistribution between RIPs, and (4) 
MRP. Although all four options are critical to the RIP’s ability to manage I MEF’s 
SECREP inventory and support customer supply requirements, in this research, 
we were only concerned with the RIP’s use of MRP and, specifically, the financial 
credits that system produces for 1st MLG. The RIP’s four options for handling 
SECREPs are illustrated in Appendix B, Reparable Issue Point Process 
Overview, which depicts in detail the actions associated with centralized 
SECREP management. It also highlights the decision process used by the RIP to 
fill customer requirements and support SECREP management at the enterprise 
level.  
The RIP supports the supply process within the MLG by exchanging 
“unserviceable items turned in by using units for serviceable like items on hand at 
the RIP” (HQMC, 1992, p. 5–9). Upon receiving an unserviceable SECREP from 
a customer, the RIP initiates a sequence of three decision points outlined by the 
Playbook for the Centralized SECREP Management Proof of Principle Pilot Test, 
commonly referred to as the POP Playbook (Marine Corps Logistics Command, 
2009). The sequence outlined in the POP Playbook offers the RIP a template for 
managing local asset posture in support of enterprise sourcing decisions (ESDs) 
and meeting customer requirements in the most efficient manner possible. Table 













Is repair necessary to support enterprise inventory?  
Explanation: 
The LOGCOM Site Manager, RIP and IMA leadership determine whether a 
requirement for the SECREP exists by evaluating local and enterprise asset 
posture, phase-in/out plans, IMA capabilities and workload, diminishing 
manufacturing sources, etc.  
Possible 
actions: 
If a requirement for the SECREP 
exists and no excess is available 
throughout the enterprise, the 
RIP inducts the item to 
maintenance at the IMA.  
If a requirement for the SECREP does 
not exist the RIP proceeds directly to 
the Code F8 decision process.  
II. Decision 
Point: 
Code F Disposition Decision Process 
Explanation: 
If the LOGCOM Site Manger, RIP, and IMA leadership decide that a 
requirement does not exist or if IMA determines repair of the SECREP 
exceeds their capacity or capability, the LOGCOM Site Manager and RIP 
OIC [officer in charge] will determine what specific action to take on the 
Code F carcass.  
Possible 
actions: 
If no enterprise requirement 
exists for the item, the RIP will 
submit the carcass9 to MRP for 
carcass credit or dispose of it via 
the Defense Reutilization 
Marketing Office (DRMO). 
DRMO is only an option for 
FLRs.  
If requirement for stock replenishment 
of the item exists (local or enterprise), 
the RIP will determine whether to 
induct for repair via 3PL or request 
disposition and replenishment via 
MRP.  
                                            
8 Code F indicates a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Supply Condition Code. The Defense 
Logistics Agency Customer Service Handbook, 18th ed., defines Code F as “unserviceable 
(Reparable); [e]conomically reparable materiel, which requires repair, overhaul, or reconditioning” 
(DLA, 2011, p. 137).  
9 MRP classifies SECREPs in two categories, excess and carcass. Excess items can be 
serviceable or unserviceable and have no requirement for replacement. Carcass items are 
unserviceable and require replacement to fill a customer requirement or replenish the RIP’s 




Enterprise sourcing decision in support of customer backorder  
Explanation: 
In the event no Code A10 SECREP is on hand to fill a customer requirement 
for a replacement SECREP, LOGCOM Site Manager, RIP, and IMA 




IMA is the first choice for repairs 
if the repair cycle time (RCT) is 
less than the order ship time 
(OST) associated with MRP 
exchange or 3PL repairs.  
The LOGCOM Site Manager will 
coordinate for redistribution within the 
enterprise if repair options are less 
timely than redistribution and if it is 
justified by the criticality of the 
SECREP. 
 
These decision points are important in order to understand the process 
the RIP uses to manage SECREPs and to understand where the MRP fits into 
that process. However, the decision points themselves are outside the scope of 
this thesis, in which we are primarily concerned with the MRP credits, regardless 
of where in the process they were generated. 
4. RIP Inventory Management 
The RIP is the sole activity within the MEF authorized to stock SDRs and 
FLRs. As such, the RIP is responsible for managing the asset posture of those 
items for the MEF by managing allowances and on-hand assets (HQMC, 1992). 
The RIP officer in charge (OIC), in coordination with the LOGCOM site manager 
and the IMA, determines materiel allowances through an annual recomputation 
based on using unit historical item usage. During this process, the RIP OIC 
establishes requisition objectives (RO) and buy lists for all SECREPs maintained 
by the RIP. The RIP OIC also has the flexibility to manage the inventory 
allowance based on their understanding of Enterprise-Sourcing Decisions 
(ESDs), repair cycle-times (RCTs) for the IMA, and OSTs for SOSs, and third-
party logistics (3PL), enabling the RIP OIC to determine economic retention 
quantities (ERQs) that usage data alone does not necessarily support (J. R. 
Copley, personal communication, June 7, 2011).  
                                            
10 Code A indicates a DLA Supply Condition Code. The Defense Logistics Agency Customer 
Service Handbook, 18th ed., defines Code A as “serviceable; new, used, repaired, or 
reconditioned materiel, which is serviceable and issuable to all customers without limitation or 
restriction” (DLA, 2011, p. 137). 
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To manage on-hand inventory, the RIP OIC uses a consolidated asset 
listing (CAL), which is a report that can be pulled daily. The CAL provides a 
snapshot of the RIP’s complete on-hand inventory by location (main RIP and 
sub-RIPs). It includes items due from SOSs, 3PL, enterprise redistribution, and 
those items that are currently work in process (WIP) at the IMA.  
5. RIP Budget and Fiscal Management 
The RIP operates two budget execution activities (BEAs),11 one each for 
the low-density account (MMFAG3) and the ground common account 
(MMFAG8). Although each of the six sub-RIPs within 1st MLG maintain separate 
accounting records, all SECREPs are funded and managed centrally by the main 
RIP at Camp Pendleton. All financial transactions of the sub-RIPs are processed 
through the main RIP under the two overall BEAs, making the sub-RIPs 
transparent to the MLG comptroller.  
D. MATERIEL RETURNS PROGRAM (MRP) 
The MRP and, specifically, the credits generated by that system, were our 
focus in this research. In the remainder of this section, we provide an overview of 
the system, describe how the RIP uses it, and explain how the MRP interfaces 
with Marine Corps property and fiscal management systems.  
1. Purpose  
The MRP is an automated system that facilitates the RIP’s reporting of 
materiel excesses and carcass returns to the SOS, processes responses from 
the SOS to the RIP, provides output to the parent inventory and financial 
subsystems for reconciliation and reporting requirements, and generates output 
reports that facilitate the RIP’s management of excesses and carcass returns 
(HQMC, 2007, p. 1–2). 
                                            
11 MCO 7300.21A (HQMC, 2008) defines Budget Execution Activity as “subdivisions of Work 
Centers… where legal responsibility for the proper management of the funds is retained” (p. C–
3).  
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2. MRP System 
As stated in the UM 4400-60 (HQMC, 2007), “the parent inventory 
systems hosted by the MRP are DSSC,12 Set Assembly System (SAS),13 and 
SASSY.14 MRP also interfaces with the Standard Accounting, Budgeting and 
Reporting System (SABRS) financial system” (p. 1–2). The MRP system 
operates with a MRP Master File for each parent system and interfaces with the 
parent system inventory files. MRP is a standard automated system that will: 
• Facilitate the reporting of materiel excesses/carcass returns; 
• Process excess responses from the source of supply; 
• Provide output to the SASSY, DSSC, and SAS systems causing 
the reduction of inventory and generation of issue transactions and 
financial data; 
• Provide expected credit documents to SABRS financial system; 
and 
• Provide output reports/management reports to the SASSY 
Management Unit (SMU) and the Reparable Issue Point (RIP), the 
DSSC, and SAS to facilitate the management of excesses reported 
and/or carcass returns (HQMC, 2007, pp. 2–6). 
The parent inventory and financial systems make up a complex network of 
databases. Discussions of that network, and how the MRP interfaces with it, are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For detailed information regarding these system 
relationships, refer to the Materiel Returns Program Users Manual, UM 4400-60 
(HQMC, 2007).  
                                            
12 Direct Support Stock Control (DSSC). The DSSC concept is to position selected types of 
materials near the actual user to reduce the supply pipeline response time. Refer to Direct 
Support Stock Control Users Manual, UM 4400-76 (HQMC, 1996). 
13 Set Assembly System (SAS). SAS provides visibility and accountability of assets used in 
the assembly/disassembly of collection-type items and upgrade to issue, including project orders 
and actions to assemble materiel under procurement, direct assembly, and the completion of 
incomplete materiel in stock. Refer to Automated Set Assembly System Users Manual, UM 4012-
100 (HQMC, 1999a). 
14 Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY). 
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3. Source of Supply (SOS) Definition 
In the context of our research, a source of supply (SOS) is an agency that 
maintains an inventory of specific items that have been assigned to a federal 
supply class15 for use within the Department of Defense (DoD). As shown in 
Figure 3, the DoD purchases these items from commercial sources and 
maintains inventories at designated locations to decrease the time a customer (a 
unit within the DoD) waits to receive a requisitioned item (W. Long, personal 
communication, April 27, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 3.   Requisition Process Flow 
Our research identified 12 SOSs16 that 1st MLG uses to manage 
SECREP inventory through the MRP. As Table 3 indicates, each SOS is 
operated by an individual service or agency and manages specific commodity 
items.  
 
                                            
15 The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA; DoD, 2011) defines Federal Supply Classification 
(FSC) in this way: FSC “identifies the supply classification of an item of supply identified under 
the federal cataloging program, an item of production and/or a homogeneous area of 
commodities in respect to their physical or performance characteristics.”  
16 The acronym SOS is interchangeable with RIC, Routing Identifier Code. The MRP uses 
SOS, and SABRS uses RIC.  
 19
Table 3.   Sources of Supply (SOS) Utilized at 1st MLG (From Defense 
Logistics Agency [DLA], 2011)  
SOS/RIC Service/Agency Location Commodity 
SMS Defense Logistics 
Agency 
DLA centrally managed Ground vehicle  
SG2 Defense Logistics 
Agency 
DLA centrally managed Fire control and optics (ground) 
SDA Defense Logistics 
Agency 
DLA centrally managed Ground vehicle 
AKZ U.S. Army USA Tank and 
Automotive Command 
(TACOM), Warren MI 
Wheeled and tracked vehicles 
B14 U.S. Army USA Armament & 
Chemical Acquisition and 
Logistics Activity 
(ACALA), Rock Island, IL
Ordnance; Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 
equipment 






B64 U.S. Army USA Aviation and Missile 
Command (AMCOM), 
Redstone Arsenal, AL 
Ground missile systems 
N35 U.S. Navy Naval Inventory Control 
Point, Mechanicsburg, 
PA 
Misc electrical equipment; Surface and 
subsurface equipment 
FGZ U.S. Air Force Ogden Air Logistics 
Center, Hill AFB, Ogden, 
UT 
Radio, communication equipment 
FLZ U.S. Air Force Warner Robins Air 
Logistics Center, Robins 
AFB, Warner Robins, GA
Communication, electronic equipment 
FHZ U.S. Air Force Oklahoma City Air 
Logistics Center, Tinker 
AFB, OK 
Generator equipment 
MPB USMC Marine Corps Logistics 
Command, Albany, GA 
Misc. equipment 
 
4. MRP Process and Transactions 
RIP management’s determination to induct a materiel excess or carcass 
into the MRP is the first step of an 11-step process. As seen in Figure 4, that 
decision triggers a series of automated and manually generated transactions 




Figure 4.   Reparable Issue Point Materiel Returns Program Process Flow (From Marine Corps LOGCOM, 2009) 
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In this thesis, we are primarily concerned with transactions associated with 
Steps 6, 7, and 11 from Figure 4 because they directly affect the generation of 
MRP credits.  
a. Step 6: Excess or Carcass 
The RIP notifies the SOS of excess or carcass SECREPs by 
submitting FTE17 (excess) or FTA (carcass) notification transactions in SASSY. 
In Chapter IV, we provide an analysis of historical FTE/FTA transactions to 
determine the variation in the amount of excess and carcass activity and to 
identify trends associated with the transactions that impact the MRP credits that 
1st MLG receives.  
b. Step 7: SOS Review and Response 
After reviewing the FTE/FTA, the SOS responds to the RIP with an 
FTR transaction indicating whether it will take the SECREP. The SOS’s FTR 
transaction will contain one of three status codes: 
• TA—return item to SOS for credit 
• TB—return item to SOS (optional) with no credit 
• TC—do not return item to SOS. Process for disposal via DRMO 
Step 7 is important because it is the first indication of whether the 
RIP will receive a credit from the SOS. However, our research focused only on 
the credits the MRP generates in later steps and did not include analysis of FTR 
transactions.  
c. Step 11: SOS Notification of Credit 
Upon receipt of an excess or carcass SECREP from RIP, the SOS 
responds with an FTZ transaction. The FTZ transaction serves as the RIP’s  
 
 
                                            
17 FTE, FTA, FTR, FTZ are all supply transaction codes used in MRP.  
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notification that the SOS has received the excess or carcass SECREP, provides 
the RIP an expected credit amount in the MRP, and triggers the actual credit to 
be issued to the RIP in SABRS. 
It is important to understand that the credit amount listed on the 
FTZ transaction in the MRP is only an estimate and does not affect the RIP’s 
financial account. The actual credit amount posts in SABRS. The potential for 
variation between the expected credit amount generated by Step 11 of the MRP 
process, and the corresponding SABRS transaction that generates the actual 
credit amount issued to 1st MLG, was one of the focal points of our research. In 
Chapter IV, we include a thorough analysis of the two transactions to determine 
differences and other trends associated with MRP credits. In Chapter IV, we 
provide an analysis of the lead-times between Steps 6 and 11 to determine 
statistical trends for all SOSs used by the MRP. 
5. MRP Credits 
1st MLG receives MRP credits in two ways, depending on the SOS 
issuing the credit. An SOS will issue a direct financial credit or provide a 
discounted exchange price on a replacement item.  
1st MLG receives actual financial credits from all Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA), U.S. Army (USA), U.S. Air Force (USAF), and U.S. Navy (USN) 
SOSs for items they submit to the MRP. An MRP credit from one of these SOSs 
translates directly to an increase in 1st MLG’s total obligation authority or 
purchasing power. For example, if AKZ (USA TACOM) issues a $100,000 MRP 
credit to 1st MLG, 1st MLG’s available funds increase by $100,000. 
Conversely, rather than issuing actual financial MRP credits, MPB (Marine 
Corps Logistics Command) uses a discounted exchange price on serviceable 
SECREP replacements. For example, based on the Federal Logistics Data 
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(FEDLOG)18 information in Figure 5, if 1st MLG submits an unserviceable tank 
engine to the MRP, the MPB would not give 1st MLG a $148,922 financial credit 
(unserviceable credit value). Instead, 1st MLG would be able to purchase a 
serviceable tank engine from the MPB for the discounted price of $371,151 
(exchange price), which is a $148,922 savings from the standard cost of 
$520,073 (unit price) for that same engine. Although the replacement engine 
costs less than if 1st MLG purchased it from another SOS, the MPB’s discounted 
exchange price does not directly increase 1st MLG’s total obligation authority. In 
our research, we omitted the financial value of the MPB’s discounted exchange 
prices and focused only on actual financial credits from the other SOSs that 
directly increase 1st MLG’s spending power. 
If, however, 1st MLG submits an M1A1 tank engine (national stock 
number [NSN] 2385014087048) through the MRP to AKZ (U.S. Army TACOM), 
AKZ would issue 1st MLG an MRP credit of $436,303 if the engine were 
serviceable or $148,922 if it were unserviceable. 
                                            
18 DLA Logistics Information Service publishes FEDLOG as a CD-ROM/DVD that “can be 
used by engineering, technical research, provisioning, procurement/contracting, supply, 
cataloging, maintenance, distribution, storage, transportation, quality assurance and disposal 
personnel to retrieve management, part/reference number, supplier, Commercial and 
Government Entity (CAGE), freight, Interchangeability and Substitutability (I&S) and 
characteristics information recorded against National Stock Numbers (NSNs)” (DoD, 2011). 
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Figure 5.   FEDLOG Screenshot (From DoD, 2011) 
E. KEY MRP PARENT SYSTEMS 
SASSY and SABRS are the key parent systems that produce data 
concerning the credit dollar amounts associated with excesses and carcass 
returns . DSSC and SAS are not within the scope of this thesis.19 
1. Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) 
The Marine Corps utilizes SASSY, an “automated supply management 
system” (HQMC, 1985b, p. 2-1–17) to accomplish supply accounting for ground 
equipment. As stated in UM-4400-123 (HQMC, 1985b), “SASSY functions as a 
centralized record keeper, stock manager, forecaster, and as a central data bank 
or information point for the using units” (p. 1-1–6).  
                                            
19 Neither the DSSC nor the SAS systems will be explained. Simply stated, these are supply 
distribution systems that are important to the MRP process, but do not support the detailed 
analysis of credit dollar amounts, which are the focus of this thesis. 
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a. SASSY–MRP Interaction 
SASSY produces a very large number of files and reports, and UM 
4400-123 outlines the definitions of the file layouts with the data elements 
(HQMC, 1985b). SASSY interacts with the MRP in two key areas: (1) The RIP 
inducts SECREPs into the MRP by submitting FTA/FTE transactions to the SOS 
via SASSY, and (2)  The SOS’s FTR response generates a D7P transaction in 
SASSY that adjusts the RIP’s property account. 
2. Standard Accounting, Budgeting and Reporting System 
(SABRS) 
SABRS, the Standard Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System, is 
the official financial accounting system for the Marine Corps. MCO 7300.21A 
(HQMC, 2008) describes SABRS as an automated system that “accounts for and 
reports on all U.S. Marine Corps funds throughout the life of the appropriation” (p. 
1–6).  
According to the Marine Corps Financial Management School (2010), 
“SABRS is a single-source reporting system designed to maximize the sharing of 
financial data between itself and other automated systems” (p. 2). SABRS 
interfaces with other automated systems to process financial transactions. The 
key data field that connects SABRS, SASSY, and MRP is the document number 
that is generated in SASSY when the RIP inducts a SECREP into the MRP. 
Although the MRP provides an estimated credit amount (FTZ), the final credit 
amounts posted in SABRS are the actual amounts received by the RIP, not 
estimates. 
F. 1ST MLG BUDGET PROCESS 
1. Financial Chain of Command 
As a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) of I MEF, 1st MLG is the Work 
Center ID (WCI) within the financial management chain of command and reports  
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directly to the I MEF comptroller on all budget and financial matters. Figure 6 
depicts the financial chain of command and flow of appropriated funds from the 
HQMC to fund managers at the using unit level. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Summary of Financial Management Chain of Command 
2. Budgeting 
1st MLG uses a requirements-based approach to develop its annual 
budget request. This approach requires commanders to clearly identify and 
prioritize all known and anticipated requirements.20 1st MLG does not provide 
budget ceilings to subordinate activities, but the overall 1st MLG budget request 
consolidates prioritized requirements within a restrictive budget ceiling provided 
by the I MEF.  
                                            
20 Requirements-based budgeting is a form of zero-based budgeting. Lee, Johnson, & Joyce 
(2004) described zero-based budgeting as “a form of what-if budgeting” (p. 122) that considers 
the impact of a program or requirement not being resourced and assumes no base exists.  
 27
1st MLG issued its FY2012 budget call on May 16, 2011.21 In guidance to 
his staff and subordinate commanders, the commanding general (CG), 1st MLG, 
highlighted anticipated resource constraints through FY2012 and reinforced the 
necessity to be “vigilant stewards of limited resources” (Hudson, 2011, p. 1). 
Identifying equipment readiness as his top priority, the CG instructed his 
subordinate commands to clearly “identify and prioritize all requirements … [in 
order] to maximize readiness within funding constraints” (Hudson, 2011, p. 1). 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review includes three main areas of literature associated with our 
research: (1) DoD and Marine Corps regulations, directives, and orders; (2) prior 
academic research and government studies; and (3) other academic resources 
pertaining to the research methodology and data analysis. In this section, we list 
and briefly describe the key sources within the three main areas. 
1. DoD and USMC Regulations, Directives, and Orders  
In our literature review, we found a significant amount of technical 
literature published by the DoD and the Marine Corps, covering all areas of our 
research. Specific areas of applicability include those regulations, directives, and 
orders that require the Marine Corps to utilize the MRP, as well as other key 
publications needed to manage the program. These resources provide the 
technical background, system capabilities, and process requirements for 
supporting materiel, maintenance, and financial management systems. Additional 
resources in this category provide the background on Marine Corps 
maintenance, supply, and budget processes necessary to understand the MRP 
and financial data presented in Chapter IV.  
                                            
21 A budget call routinely includes the commander’s overall budget development guidance, 
budget formulation guidelines specific to different units and activities, and a standard budget 
request template. 
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2. Prior Academic Research and Studies Associated With MRP 
The applicability of prior academic research, scholarly articles, and 
government reports related to the MRP was limited. Those identified in our 
review focused primarily on the increasing costs and inventory expansion of 
SECREPs across the DoD or in Services other than the USMC. We reviewed two 
prior theses in which the MRP either was the subject or was mentioned in 
relation to other areas of research. Romero and Elliott (2009) offered a brief 
explanation of the MRP in their analysis of cost drivers for organizational and 
intermediate-level repair parts across the USMC. Eades (1990) focused 
specifically on the use of the MRP to manage excess materiel within the Navy. 
Although they both mentioned credits, neither research project specifically 
examined MRP credits to determine the presence of historical trends. 
3. Acknowledgment of Other Literature  
In this review, we found that the Navy, Army, and Air Force all have 
materiel returns programs because the DoD has mandated their use; we also 
learned that all the other Services have detailed orders and users manuals for 
their individual programs. Differences most likely exist between how the 
individual Services run their programs in accordance with DoD regulations. In 
addition, through this review, we found that systems similar to the MRP might 
exist within industry. However, a more detailed and comprehensive literature 
review of the MRP within all the other services and comparable civilian systems 
was outside the scope of this research. 
This review revealed numerous DoD and service technical publications, 
orders, directives, and instructions that explain the purpose and functions of the 
MRP and how the system generates financial credits for users. However, this 
review only led us to limited instances of prior academic research and 
government and contractor reports relating directly to the MRP. The documents 
we identified focused primarily on SECREP cost and inventory management at  
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the DoD and at the service level. Through this review, we did not find any 
literature or prior research focused specifically on the effects of MRP credits at 
the using unit level. 
In this chapter, we introduced the key concepts required to develop a 
fundamental understanding of the MRP system and process, and how that 
system is used to manage SECREPs within 1st MLG. Additionally, we 
highlighted how the MRP affects 1st MLG financially with MRP credits. In the 
following chapters, we explain the process of extracting and analyzing historical 
MRP and associated SABRS data, review the limitations of that process, and 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
In order to determine whether analysis of historical MRP credits could be 
used to forecast future credits, we analyzed all MRP and SABRS transactions 
associated with selected standard document numbers (SDNs) that generate 
actual MRP credits. In Chapter II, we illustrated how the MRP process uses 
multiple systems and shows the complexity of the overall process; no single 
system (MRP, SABRS, or any other system) provides all the data required to 
conduct a complete analysis.  
Our methodology for this research was to acquire the materiel and fiscal 
data from the 1st MLG RIP and the 1st MLG comptroller’s office that would 
enable identification of systemic patterns or other trends associated with the 
MRP. We formatted the individual data sets in a way that permitted us to merge 
them together using the SDN as the connecting data field. 
With the materiel and fiscal data formatted and merged, we then analyzed 
the resulting data set to determine any variation in estimated and actual credits 
and to identify the SECREPs and SOSs that had the most significant impact on 
MRP credits at 1st MLG from January 16, 2008, to June 2, 2011.22 We used this 
analysis to determine if 1st MLG had received more or less credits than actually 
estimated, first in aggregate and then by the different SOS. From this analysis, 
we considered how factors such as SOS and National Stock Number (NSN; the 
actual SECREP inducted into the MRP) affect the time it takes MRP credits to 
post to 1st MLG’s fiscal account. We present this analysis in Chapter IV. 
Our methodology identified trends, relationships, and patterns associated 
with MRP credits at 1st MLG. We used this information to determine whether 
analysis of historical credits could be used to forecast expected credits at 1st 
MLG. 
                                            
22 A detailed explanation of this date range is presented later in this chapter. 
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1. Required Data 
The crux of our analysis was the mining and linking of information 
contained within two data sets: (1) the MRP Closed Document History File and 
(2) the SABRS Daily Transaction Report. 
a. MRP Closed Document History File 
As we discussed in Chapter II, Section D, Materiel Returns 
Program, the MRP system generates output reports for the RIP. RIP personnel 
and management use these output reports in various ways to manage the 
SECREP asset posture and MRP functions. The MRP Closed Document History 
File is one of these reports, and we obtained this file from the RIP MRP 
representatives at 1st MLG. This report provides the transaction history of a SDN 
from the date the RIP inducts a SECREP into the MRP (FTE or FTA transaction) 
to the date the document is closed in the MRP, and the RIP drops the SECREP 
from its property records. 
The key MRP data fields relevant to our research are SDN; SOS; 
the document identifier code (DIC) identifying FTA (carcass), FTE (excess), and 
FTZ (estimated credit amount); and the transaction cycle dates for all 
transactions. This MRP Closed Document History file depicts the MRP process 
and transactions presented in the Reparable Issue Point Materiel Returns 
Program Process Flow diagram (Figure 4), specifically Steps 6, 7, and 11. 
In its original form, as depicted in Figure 7, the MRP Closed 
Document History File is difficult to read and interpret without training and 
experience on the system. 
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Note. This is a screenshot of raw data provided by the RIP personnel on June 3, 
2011. 
Figure 7.   Screenshot of MRP Closed Document History File 
As a text file, this report cannot be sorted or filtered in its current 
form, making any detailed research or analysis difficult to conduct. Additionally, 
because the report does not contain data on actual MRP credits posted to 
SABRS, the MRP Closed Document History File by itself does not convey the 
whole story of any particular document. In the next section of this chapter, we 
address the steps used to prepare this data for research. 
b. SABRS Daily Transaction Report (DTR) 
In Chapter II, Section E, Key MRP Parent Systems, we discussed 
the Standard Accounting and Budgeting Reporting System (SABRS), which is 
the single-source financial reporting system that interfaces with other Marine 
Corps automated systems. The key data field that links SABRS to the MRP is the 
SDN. 
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At our request, the 1st MLG comptroller’s office pulled a DTR from 
SABRS showing all MRP-associated transactions for all the RIP budget 
execution activities (BEAs) and provided us with an Excel spreadsheet with all 
the data fields that are resident in SABRS. These SABRS data fields identified all 
the MRP transactions associated with each SDN, including dates for each 
individual transaction. 
The key SABRS data fields that were important to our research 
were the DIC of FD2, SDN, Routing Identifier Code (RIC), which is the source of 
supply, Total Transfer Amount, which is the actual credit dollar amount 
associated with the FD2 transaction, and cycle dates for all transactions. The 
Excel spreadsheet was easy to read and formatted in a way that allowed for 
detailed analysis. Figure 8 is a screenshot of the initial SABRS data we received 







Note. This is a screenshot of raw data provided by the 1st MLG comptroller on June 3, 2011. 
 
Figure 8.   Screenshot of SABRS Daily Transaction Report for MRP Data in Excel 
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After we obtained both the MRP Closed Document History File and 
the SABRS Daily Transaction report data, we determined that the data needed to 
be formatted in a way that allowed us to compare them. Specifically, we needed 
to merge the two data sets using the SDN as the common data field. In the Data 
Preparation section, we address the steps we took to prepare the data for 
detailed analysis. 
2. Data Preparation 
The initial raw materiel and financial data that we obtained from 1st MLG 
were not formatted in a manner that enabled the detailed analysis required for 
our research. In the following sections we explain the actions we took to clean 
and format the data for analysis. 
a. Preparing the MRP Closed Document History File 
The original MRP Closed Document History File that the 1st MLG 
RIP provided to us was a raw text file. We first imported this text file into 
Microsoft Access where we cleaned and formatted the data before exporting the 





Figure 9.   Screenshot of MRP Closed History File Data in Excel 
The MRP spreadsheet required further formatting before it could be 
merged with the associated SABRS data. We eliminated all blank spaces and 
headers, leaving a true flat file. Next, we filled in all the blank spaces where the 
SDN was not on the same line of all the MRP transactions; this operation 
provided the key link between the FTZ and its respective SDN. Then, we isolated 
the transactions that directly influence MRP credits, which include the FTE/FTA 
and FTZ transactions. In several cases, multiple FTZ transactions were 
associated with the same SDN. These instances generally stemmed from the 
original FTE or FTA having a quantity greater than one. For example, if, on 
January 1, the RIP notified the SOS of an excess of three items (FTE with a 
quantity of three), the SOS may have provided the first FTZ on January 15 with 
an estimated credit amount for a quantity of only one. Then, on January 20, the 
SOS provided a second FTZ with the estimated credit amount for the remaining 
two items. In this case, we simply summed all the FTZ estimated credit amounts 




which in this case was January 20. This process may have inflated some lead-
times to a small degree, but by performing this operation, we were then able to 
associate the total estimated credit amount with each individual SDN. 
Finally, all transactions associated with a given SDN were listed in 
the same row of the spreadsheet. In its final clean format, our MRP Closed 
Document History File Master showed the initial MRP transaction from the 1st 
MLG RIP (FTA or FTE), the SOS response with estimated credit amount (FTZ), 
and all associated data fields for each transaction on a single row by SDN. 
Figure 10 is an example of our MRP Closed Document History File Master file. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Screenshot of Formatted MRP Data Master File in Excel 
b. Preparing the SABRS MRP Transactions 
Unlike the MRP Closed Document History File, the SABRS Daily 
Transaction Report provided by the 1st MLG comptroller’s office was already 
formatted as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Formatting and cleaning the SABRS 
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data was limited to isolating the FD2 actual credit transactions with their 
associated data fields. Additionally, we identified several SDNs with more than 
one FD2 actual credit transaction. In these instances, we summed all the FD2 
actual credit amounts associated with each SDN and consolidated them under 
the latest FD2 cycle date. If an SDN had an FD2 for a $100 post on January 1, 
2010, and a second FD2 post for $50 on February 1, 2010, we combined the two 
actual credits to show a total FD2 actual credit amount of $150 on February 1, 
2010. As with consolidating the FTZ transactions, this process may have inflated 
slightly some lead-times; however, it allowed us to associate the total actual 
credit amount with each individual SDN. 
In its final, clean format, as depicted in Figure 11, the SABRS 
Master Daily Transaction Report contained each SDN’s FD2 actual credit amount 
and all associated data fields for that transaction on a single row. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Screenshot of Formatted SABRS Master File in Excel 
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3. Master Data File for Analysis 
With both the MRP and SABRS master files formatted as described 
previously, they were ready for us to merge into a single spreadsheet with one 
SDN on each row containing all of the MRP and SABRS transactions associated 
with that particular SDN. Merging the MRP and SABRS data in this manner 
enabled more efficient analysis of each SDN through its entire life cycle. A reader 
could easily follow any SDN from the RIP’s initial induction of the item to the 
MRP with an FTE/FTA, to the SOS’s FTZ response with the estimated credit 
amount, and, finally, to the FD2’s actual credit posting to the RIP’s financial 
account in SABRS. In addition, the final merged master spreadsheet contained 
amplifying data fields for each SDN, including NSN, transaction cycle dates, 




Figure 12.   Screenshot of Merged Master Data for Analysis 
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B. LIMITATIONS 
The primary limitation of our research was the data available for analysis. 
In particular, the MRP Closed Document History File dictated the range of data 
that we could analyze. In this section, we identify the date range limitation and 
the challenges caused by date gaps between the MRP and SABRS data that 
prevented a more comprehensive analysis. 
1. Data Date Range 
We focused our analysis on the MRP activity that occurred at 1st MLG 
from January 16, 2008, to June 2, 2011. We determined this range based on the 
MRP and SABRS data provided by 1st MLG. The SABRS Daily Transaction 
Report history goes back five years (L. Bell, personal communication, August 9, 
2011), while the MRP Closed Document History File goes back only two years (J. 
Milazzo, personal communication, July 26, 2011), making the unavailability of 
earlier data in the MRP system archive the primary factor in determining our date 
range. After we had cleaned, formatted, and merged the data, they showed the 
entire life of each SDN, from the time it was opened to the time it was closed 
(i.e., a cradle-to-grave history for each SDN within this date range). Throughout 
the process of cleaning and formatting the data, however, we repeatedly 
encountered significant gaps between the MRP and SABRS transactions. 
2. Data Gaps Between MRP AND SABRS 
We identified two main data gaps between the MRP and SABRS 
transactions provided by 1st MLG: (1) SDNs with FD2 (actual credit) transactions 
in SABRS with no associated MRP transactions and (2) SDNs with MRP FTZ 
(notification of estimated credit) transactions with no associated SABRS 
transactions. Both of these gaps prevented us from adequately analyzing these 
SDNs with the method explained previously. 
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a. FD2 Actual Credits in SABRS With No Associated MRP 
Data 
The initial gap we identified included all the documents that had 
FD2 credits in SABRS, but did not have a corresponding MRP transaction 
(FTA/E or FTZ). This disparity resulted directly from the limitations in the MRP 
Closed Document History File archive. If it took a SDN more than two years from 
the time the RIP initiated it in the MRP for the FD2 credit to post in SABRS, the 
SDN’s corresponding MRP transaction would no longer be included in the MRP 
Closed Document History file. Therefore, we had 702 SABRS FD2 credit 
transactions, totaling $7,430,994 in credits, whose associated MRP transactions 
pre-dated the available MRP data and could not be used in our analysis. We 
overcame this limitation by omitting all SABRS FD2 transactions whose 
corresponding MRP transactions pre-dated our data. After omitting those SDNs, 
we continued to find gaps between MRP and SABRS transaction data. 
b. FTZ Estimated Credits in MRP With No Associated 
SABRS Data 
Next, we identified documents in the MRP Closed Document 
History File with FTZ transactions that did not have a corresponding FD2 credit 
transaction in SABRS. In total, we identified 706 SDNs in this category. Through 
further analysis, we determined that out of that 706, only 130 SDNs had an FTZ 
with a TN status code, indicating the SOS would provide the MRP credit. The 
remaining 576 FTZ transactions all had status codes indicating that the SOS 
would not issue 1st MLG an MRP credit for these transactions for one of various 
reasons.23 As we did with the SDNs that had FD2 transactions but no MRP 
transactions, we omitted the SDNs that were still pending FD2s in SABRS. 
                                            
23 Reasons for the SOS not issuing credit included the following: TL—item was other than 
authorized for return (x 333); TM—item condition received was less than reported (x 25); TP—
item not received by SOS within prescribed timeframe (x 11); TQ—non-creditable return as 
indicated in FTR response (x 206); TV—non-creditable return authorization cancelled due to item 
not being received by SOS in prescribed time frame (x 1) 
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3. Data Date Range and Gaps 
Our research and analysis were dictated by two factors—the date range of 
the available MRP and SABRS data, and whether or not SDNs within that date 
range had corresponding MRP and SABRS transactions. Rather than just use 
the overlapping date ranges in the MRP and SABRS data to conduct analysis, 
we focused our research on MRP documents at 1st MLG that had a complete 
cradle-to-grave history between January 16, 2008, and June 2, 2011. Only those 
MRP documents that had been initiated at the RIP, had been processed by the 
SOS, and had received a credit in SABRS during that period were included in our 
analysis, which resulted in 4,282 SDNs. We omitted from our research any 
documents that the RIP initiated during this time period, but that had not received 
a credit by June 2, 2011 (706 SDNs), and those that received a credit during this 
time period but that were initiated prior to January 16, 2008 (702 SDNs). As 
Figure 13 visually depicts, our analysis only includes those SDNs with a 




Figure 13.   Scope of Analysis 
In Chapter III, we provided an overview of the data we required in order to 
analyze historical MRP credits at 1st MLG, described how we processed that 
data into a usable format, and explained the limitations and challenges we 
encountered during that process. Additionally, we highlighted how those 
limitations and challenges drove the composition of the final data set we analyze 
in Chapter IV.  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
In our analysis of historical MRP and SABRS data, we focused on two 
main areas: (a) MRP credits and (b) MRP credit lead-times. These were the most 
relevant areas to analyze because the credits have a large effect on 1st MLG’s 
budget, as we discussed in Chapter I, and the lead-times associated with these 
credits affect the ongoing budgeting process within the 1st MLG comptroller’s 
office. Additionally, we determined that a thorough understanding of the trends 
associated with MRP credits and credit lead-times was required in order to 
determine whether an analysis of historical MRP credits can be used to forecast 
expected credits.  
A. ANALYSIS OF MATERIEL RETURNS PROGRAM (MRP) CREDITS 
Our research focused on the actual MRP credits 1st MLG received in 
SABRS and the estimated credits provided by the SOSs in the MRP. In this 
section, we show which SOSs account for the largest amounts of actual MRP 
credits, the percentages of ground common/low density and excess/carcass, a 
comparison between total actual and estimated credit amounts, and a breakdown 
of the resulting underestimated and overestimated credits.  
1. Pareto Analysis of MRP Actual Credits 
During our analysis of the MRP activity at 1st MLG from January 16, 2008, 
to June 2, 2011, we identified 11 SOSs that provided actual credits to 1st MLG. 
In order to determine which SOSs produced the most activity in relation to 
credits, we conducted a Pareto analysis of actual MRP credits. Pareto analysis is 
a statistical technique used to select a limited number of tasks that produce a 
significant overall effect. The Pareto principle—“the few having the greatest 
importance and the many having little importance” (Jacobs, Chase, & Aquilano, 
2009, p. 569)—uses a logic defined in the 19th century. The numbers usually 
associated with a Pareto analysis are as follows: the large majority of effects, 
80%, are produced by a few tasks, 20%. For the purpose of our research, we 
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used a Pareto analysis, as shown in Figure 14 and Table 4, to show the SOSs 
that generated the greatest number of MRP actual credits in SABRS from 
January 16, 2008, to June 2, 2011. As addressed in Chapter III, these credit 
amounts come only from SDNs with full cradle-to-grave data. This Pareto 
analysis included all ground common and low density SECREPS, and included 
all carcass (FTA) and excess (FTE) SECREPS. 
 
 









Table 4.   Data for Pareto Analysis in Figure 14 
 
Our analysis showed that AKZ (TACOM, Warren, MI) and B16 (CECOM, 
Monmouth, NJ) provided 75.64% of the MRP actual credits, totaling $36,518,118. 
By adding in B14 (ACALA, Rock Island, IL), we calculated that these top three 
SOSs provided 91.12% of the MRP actual credits, totaling $43,989,235. All eight 
of the remaining SOSs made up only 8.88% of the MRP actual credits, totaling 
$4,287,867. 
2. Ground Common (GC) VS. Low Density (LD) and Excess (FTE) 
vs. Carcass (FTA) 
We presented the definitions of ground common, low density, excess 
(FTE), and carcass (FTA) SECREPs in Chapter II. During our analysis, we 
identified the differences between ground common and low density, and excess 
and carcass SECREPs. In the next section, we provide a more detailed analysis 
of these differences and an explanation of how we addressed them in our overall 
analysis. 
a. Ground Common (GC) vs. Low Density (LD) 
We defined ground common (MMFAG8) and low density 
(MMFAG3) SECREPs in Chapter II. The difference between the two accounts 
stems from the type of principle end item (PEI) that requires the SECREP and 




SECREPs generate actual credits when inducted into the MRP. Figure 15 shows 
the actual credit amounts and percentages of all the ground common and low 
density SECREPs that we analyzed. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Low Density (MMFAG3) and Ground Common (MMFAG8) Dollar 
Amounts and Percentages 
Ground common (MMFAG8) MRP actual credits made up 88.2% of 
all the actual credits that 1st MLG received during the SDN date range we 
analyzed, totaling $42,601,901. Low-density (MMFAG3) MRP actual credits 
made up 11.8% of all the actual credits, totaling $5,675,219. We assumed that 
this was a good representation of the overall ground common and low-density 
activity over time.  
It was outside the scope of our research to conduct a detailed 
analysis of these two categories of SECREPs individually. We conducted all of 
our analysis on all of the SDNs in our date range, making no distinction between 
ground common (MMFAG8) and low density (MMFAG3) anywhere else in this 
thesis. 
b. Excess (FTE) vs. Carcass (FTA) 
MRP classifies SECREPs in two categories, excess (FTE) and 
carcass (FTA). Excess items can be serviceable or unserviceable and have no 
requirement for replacement. Carcass items are unserviceable and require 
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replacement to fill a customer requirement or replenish the RIP’s authorized 
stockage levels. Both types of SECREPs generate actual credits when they are 
inducted into the MRP. Figure 16 shows the actual credit amounts 1st MLG 
received between January 16, 2008 and June 2, 2011 and the percentages of all 
SECREPs that we analyzed from. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Excess (FTE) and Carcass (FTA) Dollar Amounts and Percentages 
Carcass (FTA) MRP actual credits made up 74.1% of all the actual 
credits that 1st MLG received during the SDN date range we analyzed. Excess 
(FTE) MRP actual credits made up 25.9% of all the actual credits. Our original 
assumption was that this was a good representation of the overall amount of 
carcass and excess activity over time. However, as depicted in Figure 17, when 
we analyzed this data throughout the date range established for our analysis, we 
found a very clear shift between excess and carcass credits. From January 2008 
until February 2009, 1st MLG received more excess credits than carcass credits. 




Figure 17.   MRP Actual Credit Amounts for Excess (FTE) and Carcass (FTA) 
Transactions Over Time 
Determining the exact reasons for this shift was outside the scope 
of our research because numerous variables were involved.  
Overall, the excess credits have had a stable level of activity. The 
biggest spike in activity was from October to March of FY2009, which we believe 
was related to the USMC Logistics Modernization (LOGMOD) efforts to reduce 
the excess inventory across the entire Marine Corps.  
The carcass credit activity had an obvious shift starting in 
September FY2009, and, since then, has maintained the increased activity level. 
From January FY2008 to August FY2009, there were 436 MRP carcass credits 
totaling $6,143,940. In contrast, from September FY2009 to June FY2011, there 
were 2,411 MRP carcass credits totaling $29,629,929. Therefore, for these 
periods, we saw a 552% increase in MRP carcass submissions (FTA 
transactions) from 1st MLG and a 482% increase in actual carcass credits 




As depicted in Figure 18, from June FY2010 to June FY2011, 
carcass (FTA) MRP actual credits made up 91.6% of all the actual credits that 
1st MLG received. Excess (FTE) MRP actual credits made up only 8.4% of all 
the actual credits.  
 
 
Figure 18.   Excess (FTE) and Carcass (FTA) Dollar Amounts and Percentages 
from June FY2010 to June FY2011 
A more thorough analysis of the trends associated with excess 
(FTE) and carcass (FTA) SECREPs may warrant additional research in the 
future. 
3. Actual Credits vs. Estimated Credits 
Our analysis of MRP estimated and actual credits included all SDNs, 
totaling 4,282, from January 16, 2008, to June 2, 2011, that met all of the 
following: were created in MRP with an FTE or FTA, resulted in an FTZ in MRP, 
and, finally, were given an FD2 in SABRS. This provided the complete cradle-to-
grave data for each SDN. We included all the different variations of SECREPs—
ground common (MMFAG8), low density (MMFAG3), excess (FTE), and carcass 
(FTA)—in these actual versus estimated credit amounts. Figure 19 depicts the 
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total actual credits versus the total estimated credit amounts, and Figure 20 
depicts the actual credits versus the estimated credit amounts for each month in 
our data range. 
 
Note. This table shows SDNs with cradle-to-grave data from January 16, 2008, to 
June 2, 2011. 






Note. This table shows SDNs with cradle-to-grave data from January 16, 2008 to 
June 2, 2011. 
Figure 20.   Total Actual vs. Total Estimated MRP Credits in Data Range 
Historically, 1st MLG received more actual credits than the SOSs 
estimated. Our data range included $39,298,972 estimated credits in MRP 
(FTZs) and $48,277,120 actual credits in SABRS (FD2s). Therefore, 1st MLG 
received $8,978,148 more credits in SABRS (FD2) than the SOSs estimated in 
MRP (FTZ). 
a. SOS Credit Underestimation and Overestimation 
Our analysis revealed that the RIP utilized 11 SOSs for the MRP 
during the date range we analyzed. We conducted an analysis of the SOSs that 
were underestimating or overestimating their MRP credits. Figure 21 shows the 
percentage of underestimated and overestimated credits by SOS, the actual and 
estimated credit amounts, and the difference between the two credit amounts. 
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Note. SDNs with cradle-to-grave data from January 16, 2008, to June 2, 2011. 
Figure 21.   Percentage of Overestimated and Underestimated MRP Credits for 
All Sources of Supply (SOS) 
According to our research data, seven SOSs underestimated, one 
estimated correctly (an estimate of only $4,620), and three overestimated. The 
cumulative difference between all the SOSs equaled the $8,978,148 actual MRP 
credits 1st MLG received in excess of what the SOSs estimated.  
Out of the 4,282 SDNs that we analyzed, 266 SDNs were 
underestimated and 234 were overestimated. These 500 SDNs made up only 
11.67% of all the SDNs; therefore, 88.33% of all SDNs had a correct MRP credit 
estimation.  
Our analysis of the 266 underestimated SDNs revealed that 135 
different NSNs were associated with these SDNs, resulting in a total difference 
between estimated and actual credits of $13,925,831. 1st MLG submitted NSN 
2835015482910, a tank engine (Tank, 105MM, M1/M1IP), 24 times, which 
resulted in $5,375,373 of the underestimated credits. This one NSN made up 
39% of all the underestimated credits. All of the other 134 NSNs accounted for 
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the remaining 61%. Most of the underestimated NSNs were carcasses (FTA in 
MRP), condition code F, and ground common SECREPs (MMFAG8) that were 
each underestimated only one time.  
Our analysis of the 234 SDNs that the SOSs overestimated 
revealed that 128 different NSNs were associated with these SDNs, resulting in a 
total negative difference between estimated and actual credits of -$6,972,682. 
Four NSNs made up 44% of all the overestimated credits: NSN 5895011954844, 
Amplifier (SINCGARS,24 ground radio), occurred 16 times; NSN 
5820014111421, Exciter (SINCGARS, ground radio), occurred 14 times; NSN 
5998014551794, Backplane Assembly (SINCGARS, ground radio), occurred 12 
times; and NSN 5895013343164, Amplifier adapter (SINCGARS, ground radio), 
occurred 10 times. These four NSNs resulted in $3,030,673 of the overestimated 
credits. All of the other 124 NSNs accounted for the remaining 56%. Most of the 
overestimated NSNs were excesses (FTE in MRP), condition code F, and ground 
common SECREPs (MMFAG8) that were each overestimated only one time. 
In summary, our credit analysis focused on the actual MRP credits 
1st MLG received in SABRS and the estimated credits provided by the sources 
of supply (SOSs) in the MRP. In this section we analyzed the SOSs that 
accounted for the largest numbers of actual MRP credits, the percentages of 
ground common/low density and excess/carcass, the comparison of total actual 
versus estimated credit amount, and a breakdown of the resulting 
underestimated and overestimated credits. In the next section of this chapter, we 
describe our analysis of the MRP credit lead-times.  
B. ANALYSIS OF CREDIT LEAD-TIMES 
For the purpose of our research, credit lead-time refers to the number of 
days from the RIP notifying the SOS of an excess or carcass in MRP (FTE or 
FTA transaction) to the SOS issuing a financial credit to the RIP in SABRS (FD2 
transaction). We started with an analysis of all documents in our entire data 
                                            
24 Single Channel Ground-Air Radio System (SINCGARS). 
 56
range, and then we identified and briefly described outliers that could interfere 
with a more detailed analysis. Next, we focused the analysis on specific areas to 
highlight trends and patterns within the data. Specifically, we analyzed the 
variability in lead-times between SOSs and the effect that factors such as NSN 
and condition code have on MRP credit lead-time. 
1. Analysis of All Lead-Time Data 
Lead-time analysis of our complete data range resulted in the descriptive 
statistics displayed in Table 5. 
Table 5.   MRP Credit Lead-Time Descriptive Statistics (All Data) 
 
The 4,282 documents had a mean of 33.66 days and a median of 22 
days, and they ranged from five to 990 days. As depicted in Figure 22, our 
analysis revealed a clear cluster of SDNs with lead-times of fewer than 200 days. 
However, lead-times extending as far out as 990 days impacted the mean. In our 
 
 57
analysis of credit lead-times, we used median rather than mean. With a range of 
985 days, the outliers affected the median less, making it more representative of 
the data’s central tendency. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Lead-Time Variability Chart by Source of Supply (All Data) 
Through this analysis, we also determined which SOSs do not have a 
significant impact on 1st MLG’s median credit lead-times. For example, N35 and 
FHZ collectively contained only four SDNs, totaling $21,315 in MRP credits. 
Because they made up only 0.009% of all SDNs and 0.004% of all credit dollars, 
we omitted N35 and FHZ from further analysis. 
2. Distribution of Credit Dollars by Lead-Time 
The longest lead-time we identified within the data was 990 days, which is 
over 2.5 years. However, as Figure 23 shows, almost all of 1st MLG’s MRP 
credits posted within six months: 56% within 30 days, 95% within 90 days, and 
99% ($47.7 million of $48.3 million) within 180 days. 
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Figure 23.   Cumulative MRP Credits by Lead-Time 
3. Description of SDNs With Lead-Times Greater Than 180 Days 
Our data contained only 38 documents with lead-times between 180 and 
990 days. Those 38 documents totaled $517,114 in actual credits, which 
represented 1% of 1st MLG’s total MRP credits. 
The 38 documents with lead-times exceeding 180 days came from six of 
the 11 SOSs in our data. Figure 24 depicts the proportion of SDNs by SOS for 
the entire data range (left pie chart) and the proportion of SDNs by SOS for 
documents with credit lead-times exceeding 180 days (right pie chart). Table 6 
contains the supporting data.  
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Figure 24.   Comparison: Percent of Total SDNs by SOS for Total Data Range 




Table 6.   Data for Figure 24 
We used this analysis to highlight that although only 1% of the documents 
in our complete data range came from SG2 ($396,367), 29% of the documents 
with lead-times greater than 180 days came from SG2 ($81,339). SG2 is the only 
SOS with disproportionate representation in the 38 SDNs with credit lead-times 
exceeding 180 days.  
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Lastly, we checked to see whether the NSNs associated with the 38 SDNs 
with lead-times greater than 180 days were also present in documents with 
shorter lead-times. Of the 29 NSNs, all but four also had documents with lead-
times of 180 days or less. Table 7 identifies the four NSNs whose lead-times 
always exceeded 180 days. 
Table 7.   NSNs With Credit Lead-Times Consistently Over 180 Days 
 
In order to capture a more accurate representation of the data, we treated 
all documents with credit lead-times greater than 180 days as outliers and 
omitted them from further analysis. Figure 25 highlights the 38-outlier documents 
we omitted from further analysis.  
 
Figure 25.   Outlier SDNs With Credit Lead-Times Greater Than 180 Days 
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4. Analysis of SDNs With Lead-Times Less Than 180 Days 
All further analysis of credit lead-times included only those documents that 
had MRP credits that posted in SABRS via FD2 transaction within 180 days of 
the RIP submitting the FTE or FTA transaction in MRP. Lead-time analysis of 
those documents resulted in the descriptive statistics contained in Table 8. Note 
that when we eliminated documents with lead-times greater than 180 days, the 
median remained 22 days, while the mean changed from 33.6 to 30.09 days and 
the standard deviation from 39.7 to 23.5 days. 
Table 8.   Descriptive Statistics of SDNs With Lead-Times Less Than 180 
Days 
 
We performed a goodness-of-fit test and determined that the credit lead-
times for these documents made up a lognormal distribution. To validate the 
distribution and statistics we derived from our observed data, we used Crystal 
Ball to simulate 10,000 iterations of the median lead-time. As depicted in Figure 
26, this simulation resulted in only minor statistical differences between the lead-
times in our original data and the lead-times simulated in Crystal Ball. Table 9 
contains the supporting data for Figure 26.  
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Figure 26.   Median Lead-Time (< 181 Days) Simulation Results 
Table 9.   Data for Figure 26 Results 
 
The simulation generated a longer median lead-time, 24 versus 22 days, 
but a tighter standard deviation, 22.09 versus 23.58 days. These statistics 
indicate that over time, given an increase in observed data, the median lead-time 
could be slightly longer than we observed in our data, but the distribution of the 
individual lead-times would be slightly tighter around that median. However, in 
this case, the median should not be used by itself as an accurate predictor of 
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future lead-times. The lognormal distribution is skewed right with a fat tail that 
results in a significant standard deviation and a coefficient of variation close to 
1.0.  
As described in the following subsections, we analyzed how SOS, NSN, 
and condition code affected MRP credit lead-times. 
a. Analysis of Lead-Time by SOS 
In this section, we present an analysis of the variation in lead-times 
between SOSs. Figure 27 highlights how the lead-times within each SOS are 
distributed around the grand median25 of 22 days. Only one SOS had a median 
under the grand median (B16, 20 days), while three were within one day of the 
grand median (AKZ and B14, 23 days; and B64, 22 days). The remaining SOSs 





                                            
25 The statistical software program JMP uses the term grand median to describe the overall 
median of an entire sample across multiple categories. For the purpose of our research, grand 
median lead-time refers to the overall median of all SDNs from all SOS.  
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Figure 27.   Lead-Time Variability by Source of Supply (180 Days or Less) 
Although five of the nine SOSs had median lead-times that 
exceeded the grand median by as many as 50 days, these five SOSs had 
relatively little overall impact on 1st MLG’s total MRP credits. As depicted in 
Figure 28, the five SOSs with median lead-times greater than the grand median 
collectively made up only 5% of all SDNs and 7% of all MRP credits at 1st MLG. 
The grand median for MRP credit lead-times at 1st MLG were driven by only 
three of the 11 sources of supply: AKZ, B14, and B16. Table 10 contains the data 




Figure 28.   Summary of Sources of Supply with Median Lead-Times Greater 
Than 22 Days 
Table 10.   Data for Figure 28 
 
b. Analysis of Lead-Time by NSN  
Out of the 805 total NSNs found in our complete data range, 26 of 
those NSNs generated $250,000 or more during the period we examined. These 
26 NSNs were included in 781 SDNs, which resulted in $28,043,400 in credits. 
For example, in one case, 1st MLG submitted two MRP SDNs for tank thermal 
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receivers (NSN 1240012718060) and received $330,486 in MRP credits. In 
another example, 1st MLG submitted 168 SDNs for SINCGARS radio 
transmitter-receivers (NSN 5820013652725) and received $4,255,355 in MRP 
credits. Table 11 contains the data for the top 26 MRP credit-generating NSNs at 
1st MLG and also highlights the range of differences between the minimum and 
maximum lead-times for those NSNs. For NSNs that appeared in more than one 
SDN (the RIP submitted an NSN to the SOS on multiple occasions), we analyzed 
the difference between the minimum and maximum lead-times. The lead-times 
for these documents had a median of 24 days and a standard deviation of 24.3 
days. 
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Table 11.   Lead-Time Data for NSNs That Generated Greater Than $250,000 
in MRP Credits 
 
 
Credit lead-times for these documents ranged from five to 265 days with a 
median of 24 days. Eleven of the 26 NSNs had a difference of 90 or more days 
between their minimum and maximum credit lead-times. 
Reviewing one particular NSN illustrates these statistics. Between 
February 2008 and June 2011, 1st MLG submitted NSN 2520013259834 
(hydraulic transmission for an M1A1 tank) to the MRP seven times. Table 12 
contains the data for those SDNs. 
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Table 12.   Credit Lead-Times for NSN 2520013259834 
 
The final document, with the 265-day lead-time, resulted in 
$238,231 in MRP credits. Although the median lead-time for this high-dollar item 
was 27 days, 1st MLG had almost $250,000 held up for close to nine months on 
this single document. This example highlights a trend we found across the entire 
data range. Despite a relatively low median credit lead-time for all SDNs, the 
outliers lead to a large standard deviation. This becomes increasingly more 
important as the dollar value of the SDN increases. Cases such as these offer 
the RIP leadership the specific opportunity to manage by exception.  
c. Analysis of Lead-Time by Condition Code 
We identified seven different condition codes in our data range; 
however, five of those condition codes, B, H, K, S, and U, collectively made up 
less than 0.01% of all documents in our data, so we omitted them from further 
analysis. Condition codes A (serviceable) and F (unserviceable) made up over 
99% of all documents in our data range. Figure 29 depicts the variability in credit 




Figure 29.   Variability in Credit Lead-Time by Condition Code 
The median lead-times and standard deviations were 21 and 32 
days, respectively, for condition code A, and 24 and 50 days for condition code 
F. One possible explanation for the larger standard deviation with condition code 
F is that the RIP submitted some of those documents to the SOS as condition 
code A. Upon receipt of the item, the SOS discovered something during their 
inspections that led them to downgrade the condition code to F. SOSs 
downgraded condition codes from A to F on approximately 9%, or 39, of the 471 
documents the RIP submitted as condition code A. Despite the higher standard 
deviation for condition code F SDNs, we concluded through this analysis that 
condition code does not have any significant impact on the credit lead-time of 
MRP documents at 1st MLG.  
C. SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
In our analysis of historical MRP and SABRS data, we focused on two 
main areas: (1) MRP credits and (2) MRP credit lead-times. The analysis 
enabled us to answer our primary and secondary research questions, as we 
discussed in Chapter V. 
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In the MRP credits section, we ascertained the following key statistics 
from our analysis: 
• Sources of supply AKZ (TACOM, Warren, MI), B16 (CECOM, 
Monmouth, NJ), and B14 (ACALA, Rock Island, IL) provided 
91.12% of the MRP actual credits, totaling $43,989,235. All eight of 
the remaining SOSs made up only 8.88% of MRP actual credits, 
totaling $4,287,867.  
• Ground common (MMFAG8) MRP actual credits made up 88.2% of 
all the actual credits that 1st MLG received, totaling $42,601,901. 
Low density (MMFAG3) MRP actual credits made up 11.8% of all 
the actual credits, totaling $5,675,219.  
• Carcass (FTA) MRP actual credits made up 74.1% of all the actual 
credits and excess (FTE) MRP actual credits made up 25.9% of all 
the actual credits that 1st MLG received during the SDN range we 
analyzed. However, from June FY2010 to June FY2011, carcass 
(FTA) MRP actual credits made up 91.6% of all the actual credits 
that 1st MLG received. Excess (FTE) MRP actual credits made up 
only 8.4% of all the actual credits. 
• 1st MLG received more actual credits than the SOSs estimated. 
Our data range included $39,298,972 in estimated credits in the 
MRP (FTZs) and $48,277,120 in actual credits in SABRS (FD2s). 
Therefore, 1st MLG received $8,978,148 more in credits in SABRS 
(FD2) than the SOSs estimated in the MRP (FTZ). 
• Out of the 4,282 SDNs that we analyzed, 266 SDNs were 
underestimated and 234 were overestimated. These 500 SDNs of 
underestimated and overestimated credits made up only 11.67% of 
all the SDNs; therefore, 88.33% of all the SDNs had a correct MRP 
credit estimation.  
In the MRP credit lead-time section, we ascertained the following key 
statistics and information from our analysis: 
• Despite some SDNs taking as long as 990 days to post credits in 
SABRS, 95% of 1st MLG’s MRP credits posted within 90 days of 
the RIP submitting a new MRP document to an SOS.  
• Some differences in median lead-times existed between the 
different SOSs. However, the median MRP credit lead-time at 1st 
MLG was driven by three SOSs: AKZ, B14, and B16. Although the 
remaining eight SOSs contained outliers with median lead-times up 
to 50 days longer than the grand median, these outliers produced 
only 7.47% of 1st MLG’s MRP credits during the date range we 
analyzed.  
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• Whether considering SOS, NSN, or condition code, we discovered 
that credit lead-times consistently followed a lognormal distribution 
with medians between 22 and 24 days.  
• The lognormal distribution and significant standard deviation 
associated with MRP credit lead-times at 1st MLG prevented us 
from using any measure of central tendency by itself as an accurate 
predictor of future credits.  
 
 72
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 73
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Our research resulted in a descriptive analysis of historical MRP credits at 
1st MLG. Throughout the research and analysis process, we answered our 
primary and secondary research questions along with some other overarching 
conclusions about the Materiel Returns Program. Additionally, we identified 
several opportunities for future research, which we address as recommendations 
following the summary of our conclusions. 
1. Conclusion to Primary Research Question 
The purpose of our research was to determine whether an analysis of 
historical MRP credits at 1st MLG could be used to forecast the timing and 
magnitude of expected credits. Our analysis of MRP credits at 1st MLG indicates 
that it should be possible to forecast expected credits.  
We support this conclusion with two main findings:  
• 88.33% of the time, the MRP credits SOSs issued to 1st MLG in 
SABRS matched the estimated credit amounts provided by the 
SOS. 
• 95% of 1st MLG’s MRP credits posted within 90 days of the RIP 
submitting a new MRP document to a SOS. 
These findings indicate that for an overwhelming majority of the items 1st 
MLG submitted to a SOS through MRP, the estimated credit amount provided by 
the SOS equaled the actual credit amount paid by the SOS (88.3%) and the SOS 
paid that credit within 90 days of the RIP initiating that SDN (95%). These large 
percentages lead us to believe that 1st MLG could use a forecasting method to 
predict future credits based on active MRP documents. 
Next, we address the conclusions for our secondary research questions. 
The answers to these questions support our primary research question, but they 
are also significant as stand-alone findings. 
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2. Conclusions to Secondary Research Questions 
What are the differences between MRP estimated credits and the actual 
credits 1st MLG received? 
In aggregate, 1st MLG’s actual MRP credits in SABRS exceeded the 
SOSs’ estimated credits by 18.6%. Our research found $39,298,972 in estimated 
credits and $48,277,120 in actual credits. Although a difference exists, 88.33% of 
the time the SOS issued a credit in SABRS that was identical to their estimate in 
MRP. 
What percentage of MRP credits does 1st MLG receive within 30, 90, and 
180 days of submitting a new MRP document to the SOS? 
1st MLG received 56% of all MRP credits within 30 days, 95% within 90 
days, and 99% within 180 days. 
In addition to answering our primary and secondary research questions, 
our analysis uncovered several other relevant conclusions. These findings 
guided our recommendations for potential future research into MRP.  
3. Additional Conclusions 
a. Primary Drivers of MRP Credits at 1st MLG 
Our research showed that between January 16, 2008, and June 2, 
2011, 1st MLG submitted 806 different NSNs to 11 different SOSs via MRP. 
However, each NSN and SOS did not have the same impact on MRP credit 
trends. Our analysis highlighted that a relatively small number of NSNs and 
SOSs drove trends associated with MRP credits at 1st MLG.  
Of all MRP credits issued to 1st MLG, 91% came from only three of 
the 11 SOSs: AKZ, B16, and B14. In addition to accounting for less than 9% of 
the MRP credits, the remaining nine SOSs had virtually no effect on median 
credit lead-time. 
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b. Challenges with Data  
At the time of our research, no single repository, system, or 
database contained all the data required to conduct a thorough analysis of MRP 
credits. We had to pull data from multiple legacy systems, SABRS and MRP, 
reformat it, and merge it into a single document that could be analyzed. However, 
MRP archive limitations still restricted the range of data available for analysis. As 
we explained in Chapter III, the principal limitation on analysis of MRP credits 
was that the MRP Closed Document History File archives only two years of data.  
c. System Defects  
Our analysis indicated that the MRP process/system works as 
intended with respect to credits. All things being equal, if the RIP submits an 
MRP document today, there is a 95% chance that 1st MLG will receive the actual 
credit within 90 days and an 88% chance that the credit in SABRS will match the 
SOS’s estimate in the FTZ transaction. In reality though, all things are not equal. 
Different factors introduce degrees of variation in both credit amount (accuracy 
between estimate and actual) and lead-time. One method of analyzing these 
variations is to consider them as defects in the system.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our research consisted of descriptive analytics of MRP credits at 1st MLG. 
We conducted trend analysis to determine what happened in the past and drew 
overarching conclusions about MRP credits and the program. Our 
recommendations revolve around the necessity for continued research on this 
topic. In order to forecast what could happen in the future (prescriptive analytics) 
or to optimize what should happen in the future (predictive analytics), certain 
forecasting methods or models will need to be created (Nestler, 2011).  
In FY2011, 38% ($25.9 million) of 1st MLG’s total planned budget ($68.4 
million) went to RIP operations; MRP credits effectively increased 1st MLG’s total 
obligation authority by 27%. Continued research on this topic is critical if 1st 
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MLG, and the Marine Corps as a whole, are to take full advantage of the fiscal 
opportunity presented by MRP credits. Doing so could result in MRP process 
improvements and more efficient budgeting in a fiscally constrained environment. 
The next sections list our recommendations for future research. 
1. Develop Forecast Model  
We concluded through our research that forecasting expected MRP 
credits should be possible. Further research should be conducted to develop a 
method of forecasting expected MRP credits. Any method that is developed 
should be able to interface with all the legacy systems that are currently being 
utilized and with Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS–MC). 
2. Conduct Enterprise-Wide Analysis to Compare and Contrast 
MLGs 
During our research, we were unable to locate any prior research on MRP 
credits within any Marine Force (MARFOR) or at the enterprise level of the 
USMC. We recommend extending our descriptive analytical research to include 
the other MARFORs. Similar trend analysis of MRP credits across the USMC 
could assist with identifying and promulgating, enterprise-wide, best practices 
associated with the MRP process.  
3. Determine the Effects of GCSS–MC on Ability to Manage MRP  
In order to conduct our research, we had to pull data from multiple legacy 
systems, reformat it, and merge it into a single integrated and relational data set. 
No single system, repository, or database contained all data required to conduct 
a thorough analysis of MRP credits. After we completed our research, 1st MLG 
transitioned to GCSS–MC. We recommend further research to determine what 
effects GCSS–MC has had on 1st MLG’s ability to manage the MRP and to 
determine its impact on credits. 
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4. Develop Metrics to Measure the Accuracy of SOS Estimates  
In 2009, LOGCOM identified total materiel returns credits as an area 
requiring a method for tracking at the enterprise level (Marine Corps LOGCOM, 
2009). LOGCOM listed this requirement as, “Information to Capture During the 
Conduct of the POP Pilot Test” (Marine Corps LOGCOM, 2009, p. 18). As of the 
completion of our research, we were unable to determine whether LOGCOM 
achieved this requirement. If it does not yet exist, we recommend further 
research to develop a method of tracking and analyzing MRP credits at the 
enterprise level.  
5. Investigate Root Causes of System Defects (Poor Credit 
Accuracy/Long Credit Lead-Times)  
We identified one area where 1st MLG may be able to increase the 
number of MRP credits they receive from SOSs. Our data contained 576 SDNs 
for which the SOS ultimately did not issue an MRP credit for what appear to be 
preventable reasons. The status codes on the SOS FTZ transactions indicated 
reasons such as the RIP sending an item not authorized for return, the item’s 
condition being different from what the RIP reported, and the item not arriving at 
the SOS within the prescribed timeframe.  
We do not suggest that the RIP or SOSs bear the full responsibility for 
these defects, but some level of human error in the process could be the root 
cause of these preventable defects. We did not analyze the MRP process itself 
or the human-element touch points within that process.  
We recommend additional research into the MRP process, specifically to 
determine the root causes of system defects and their associated effects on MRP 
credits. One possible method of analyzing the system defects would be applying 
a Six Sigma root cause analysis. 
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C. THESIS CONCLUSION 
Budgets are shrinking, but 1st MLG will maintain a high operational tempo 
for the foreseeable future. This dynamic places a significant challenge on 1st 
MLG’s comptroller who must determine the most efficient allocation of 
increasingly scarce resources. Our research shows that the comptroller has a 
unique opportunity to squeeze even more efficiency out of 1st MLG’s budget by 
applying MRP credits to planned resource requirements. MRP credits have 
increased 1st MLG’s total obligation authority by 27% annually since 2008; 
however, the comptroller has been unable to leverage these funds due to an 
inability to forecast future credits. Our research shows that forecasting MRP 
credits should be possible. We believe that continuing research on MRP with the 
topics we recommend will make forecasting MRP credits possible. 
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APPENDIX A. USMC MAINTENANCE 
Marine Corps maintenance has been in a transition phase over the last 
decade and is still realigning its maintenance approach. Simply put, maintenance 
for Marine Corps ground equipment has been transitioning from five echelons of 
maintenance (EOM) to three levels of maintenance (LOM), defined as 
realignment of maintenance (ROM). 
 
Figure 30.   USMC Realignment of Maintenance (ROM) 
The Marine Corps is currently working to publish a new order, MCO 
4790.23 Ground Equipment Maintenance Policy, but has been stalled due to 
conversion issues with the Global Combat Support System Marine Corps 
(GCSS–MC) and a naming convention that is standardized with other Services. 
Therefore, at the time this thesis was written, the definitions in this appendix are 




The Marine Corps defines maintenance as “all action taken to retain 
materiel in or restore it to a specified condition. It includes: inspection, testing, 
servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding, and reclamation” 
(HQMC, 1994, p. 1–3).  
The Marine Corps approved a Realignment of Maintenance (ROM) 
initiative in 1999. In 2003, MARADMIN 581/03, Establishment of Three Levels of 
Maintenance, was published  
to announce the establishment of three levels of maintenance on 
USMC ground equipment. … Historically, the Marine Corps has 
performed five Echelons of Maintenance (EOM) on ground 
equipment … today the EOM approach reduces maintenance 
effectiveness. … Ground maintenance production is also hindered 
by fragmented maintenance processes, which result from 
redundant MAGTF layering and a lack of single process owner for 
maintenance. …The Marine Corps has determined that three 
Levels of Maintenance (LOM) vice five echelons is the most 
effective approach to ground maintenance in support of all 
MAGTFs. … Transitioning from five EOM into three LOM have 
been integrated into one consolidated effort entitled Realignment Of 
Maintenance (ROM). (HQMC, 2003, p.1) 
The three levels are defined in MARADMIN 581/03 as follows: 
Organizational Level  
The intent of organizational level maintenance is sustaining 
equipment in a mission capable status and is both preventive and 
corrective in nature. Organizational level maintenance includes 
expeditious assessment and maintenance conducted under 
battlefield conditions. Organizational level maintenance normally 
entails inventory, cleaning, inspecting, preserving, lubricating, 
adjusting and testing, as well as replacing parts and components 
with common shop tools per individual training standards (ITS) 
and/or training and readiness events (TRE) and technical 
publications. 
Intermediate Level 
The intent of intermediate level maintenance is to return equipment 
to a mission capable status and is both preventative and corrective 
in nature. Intermediate level maintenance actions include 
inspection/in-depth diagnosis, modification, replacement, 
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adjustment, and limited repair or evacuation/disposal of principle 
end items and their selected reparables and components/sub-
components. Intermediate level maintenance also includes 
calibration and repair of test, measurement and diagnostic 
equipment (TMDE), as well as fabrication of items, precision 
machining, and various methods of welding. Intermediate level 
maintenance is performed by specially trained mechanics and 
technicians per individual training standards (ITS) and/or training 
and readiness events (TRE) and technical publications.  
Depot Level 
The intent of depot level maintenance is to sustain equipment 
throughout its life cycle by performing major repair, overhaul, or 
complete rebuild of parts, subassemblies, assemblies or principle 
end items to include manufacturing parts and conducting required 
modifications, testing, calibrating, and reclaiming. Marine Corps 
multi-commodity maintenance centers, other service depots, 
commercial industrial facilities, original equipment manufacturer or 
a combination thereof may perform depot level maintenance. Depot 
level maintenance also supports lower level maintenance by 
providing overflow maintenance services, and by performing on site 
maintenance services including technical assistance when 
required. (HQMC, 2003, p. 2) 
According to MCO P4790.2C, the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance 
Management System (MIMMS) Field Procedure Manual (HQMC, 1994), the 
Marine Corps historically defined the maintenance levels and echelons of 
maintenance as follows:  
Maintenance is divided into field and depot level maintenance. Field 
and depot level maintenance are divided into maintenance 
categories and echelons as follows: 
(1) The categories of maintenance and corresponding echelons of 
maintenance (EOM) are organizational (first and second echelons), 
intermediate (third and fourth echelons), and depot (fifth echelon). 
(a) Organizational maintenance is maintenance 
production, scheduled or unscheduled, which is the 
responsibility of and performed by the using unit on table of 
equipment (T/E) and special allowance assigned equipment. 
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(b) Intermediate maintenance is performed by designated 
activities in direct support of using organizations. It includes 
calibration and repair/replacement of damaged or 
unserviceable parts and provides technical assistance, 
support through a secondary reparable issue point, and/or 
contact team support to using organizations. Intermediate 
maintenance normally includes third and fourth EOM’s and 
in Instances when supporting overflow organizational 
requirements may include second echelon as well. 
(c) Depot Maintenance is maintenance requiring major 
overhaul or complete rebuild of parts, subassemblies, 
assemblies or end items, including the manufacture of parts 
and performance of required modifications, testing, and 
reclamation. Depot maintenance serves to support lower 
categories of maintenance by providing technical assistance 
and performing maintenance beyond their responsibility. 
Depot maintenance provides stocks of serviceable 
equipment by using more extensive repair facilities than are 
available in lower level maintenance activities. Fifth, echelon 
maintenance is normally associated with this category and is 
scheduled to employ production and assembly line methods 
whenever practicable. 
(2) The Marine Corps further subdivides the maintenance 
categories into EOMs to more accurately identify capabilities. So 
tasks most appropriate to the unit’s available commodity, 
personnel, tools, equipment, and parts, can be identified. 
(a) First EOM is maintenance performed by the user or 
operator of the equipment. It includes the proper care, use, 
operation, cleaning, preservation, lubrication, and such 
adjustment, minor repair, testing, and parts replacement as 
may be prescribed by pertinent technical publications, tools 
and parts allowances. There is no requirement to collect 
MIMMS/AIS data at first echelon. 
(b) Second EOM is maintenance performed by specially 
trained personnel in the organization. Appropriate 
publications authorize the second EOM, additional tools and 
necessary parts, supplies, test equipment, and skilled 
personnel to perform maintenance beyond the capabilities 
and facilities of first echelon. This includes performance of 
scheduled maintenance, diagnosis and isolation of readily 
traced equipment malfunctions, replacement of major 
assemblies/modular components, which can be readily 
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removed/installed and do not require critical adjustment, and 
replacement of easily accessible piece parts not authorized 
at first echelon. 
(c) Third EOM is maintenance authorized by appropriate 
publications to be performed by specially trained personnel 
either in an intermediate or organizational role. Third echelon 
includes diagnosis and isolation of equipment/modular 
malfunctions including: adjustment and alignment of 
modules using test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment 
(TMDE); repair by replacement of modular components and 
piece parts, which do not require extensive post 
maintenance testing or adjustment; limited repair of modular 
components requiring cleaning; seal replacement; 
application of external parts; repair kits; and accomplishment 
of minor body work and evaluation of emissions of internal 
combustion engines. 
(d) Fourth EOM is maintenance normally associated to 
semi-fixed or permanent shops of intermediate maintenance 
activities and frequently associated to organizational shops 
of units with a commodity peculiar mission. Fourth EOM 
includes diagnosis, isolation, adjustment, calibration, 
alignment, and repair of malfunctions to the internal piece 
part level. Fourth EOM also includes replacement of 
defective modular components not authorized at lower 
echelons; repair of major modular components by grinding or 
adjusting items such as valves, tappets or seats; replacing 
internal and external piece parts to include solid state 
integrated circuits and printed circuit boards/cards; and 
performance of heavy body, hull turret, and frame repair. 
(e) Fifth EOM is maintenance normally performed by depot 
maintenance activities and at intermediate maintenance 
activities when specially authorized by the CMC (LPP). It 
includes overhaul/rebuild of end items/modular components; 
repairs, which exceed the capability of lower echelon units 
where special environmental facilities or specific tolerances 
are required; nondestructive testing; special 
inspection/modification requiring extensive disassembly, or 
elaborate test equipment; manufacturing items not provided 
or available; and provision of wholesale level direct 
exchange support. (HQMC, 1994) 
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APPENDIX B. REPARABLE ISSUE POINT PROCESS OVERVIEW 
 
Figure 31.   Reparable Issue Point Process Overview (From Marine Corps LOGCOM, 2009) 
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